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At the 2008 summit in Hokkaido, Japan, and again in 2009 in 
L’Aquila, Italy, G-8 leaders called for a 50 percent global reduc-
tion in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions below current levels 
by 2050 to avoid “the most serious consequences of climate 
change.” Meeting this goal will require transforming the way 
energy is produced, delivered, and consumed across all sectors of 
the economy and regions of the world. Buildings, which account 
for nearly 40 percent of global energy demand today and 30 
percent of projected growth in energy demand between now 
and 2050, will play a critical role in this process (IEA 2008b).
Improving  the  energy  efficiency  of  buildings  is  often 
. “Environment and Climate Change,” July 8, 2008, available at www.
g8.utoronto.ca/summit/2008hokkaido/ (accessed on April 24, 2009) and “G8 
Leaders Declaration: Responsible Leadership for a Sustainable Future.” July 8, 
2009, available at http://www.g8italia2009.it/ (accessed on August 3, 2009).
heralded as the cheapest way to cut emissions, with a wealth 
of individual investment options available at negative cost.2 
Few studies, however, have attempted to estimate the cost of 
completely  overhauling  the  buildings  sector  to  meet  long-
term emission-reduction goals. The World Business Council 
for Sustainable Development’s (WBCSD) Energy Efficiency 
in Buildings project has developed a model, based on a rich 
database  of  building  types,  designs,  and  technologies,  that 
makes such analysis possible (WBCSD 2009).
This policy brief utilizes the WBCSD model to assess the 
cost of transforming the global building stock in line with the 
G-8’s 50 percent emission-reduction target and evaluates the 
policy options for achieving such a transformation. It demon-
strates that while aggressive, whole-building improvements in 
energy efficiency are more expensive than studies of individual 
building components have suggested, average abatement costs 
in the buildings sector are still cheaper than in other sectors. 
Barriers  to  efficiency  investment  in  the  buildings  sector, 
however, make it difficult to take advantage of these low-cost 
abatement opportunities, even with a relatively high carbon 
price. New approaches to financing are important to overcom-
ing these investment barriers, but such tools will need to be 
coupled  with  improved  standards  for  building  construction, 
government spending to buy down “first costs,” (the upfront 
investment required to increase energy efficiency) and improved 
awareness of potential energy savings among households and 
firms. Successful transformation of the buildings sector would 
significantly reduce the cost of addressing climate change and 
can help to prevent the higher energy prices that result from 
climate policy from raising consumers’ overall energy costs.
ROLE OF BUILDINGS IN ADDRESSING GLOBAL 
CLIMATE CHANGE
Buildings are the largest source of energy demand globally 
and are central to efforts to address climate change. Heating, 
2. The most well-known study of abatement costs for building efficiency is 
McKinsey & Company (2009).
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cooling, and powering residential, commercial, and govern-
ment buildings consumes 38 percent of all energy produced 
worldwide,  compared  with  26  percent  for  transportation 
(IEA  2008d).  If  the  energy  consumed  in  manufacturing 
the  steel,  cement,  aluminum,  and  glass  used  in  building 
construction is included, this number grows to more than 
50 percent. With rapid urbanization and rising income levels 
in developing countries and suburban expansion in developed 
countries, energy demand in the buildings sector has grown by 
2 percent per year on average for the past decade (IEA 2008c). 
And with only 50 percent of the world’s population living in 
cities at present, buildings will continue to drive global energy 
demand for years to come (World Bank 2009). 
How these new buildings are constructed, and how exist-
ing  buildings  are  maintained  or  renovated,  will  shape  the 
world’s ability to reduce CO2 emissions and to address global 
climate change. Current global emissions equal 28 billion tons 
of CO2 each year. Buildings are responsible for 8.4 billion tons 
of this, either directly by burning coal, oil, or natural gas for 
heating and cooking or indirectly through the consumption of 
fossil fuel–generated electricity delivered through an electrical 
grid. The International Energy Agency (IEA) predicts that by 
2050, global CO2 emissions will grow to 62 billion tons, 20. 
billion tons of which will come from buildings, putting the 
world on a dangerous trajectory (IEA 2008b). 
To avoid the worst effects of climate change, the Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) recommended in 
its Fourth Assessment Report reducing greenhouse gas emis-
sions by 50 to 85 percent below current levels to limit global 
temperature increases to between 2 to 2.4 degrees Celsius above 
preindustrial levels (IPCC 2007). The 50 percent target was 
endorsed by leaders of the G-8 group of industrialized countries 
during their 2008 summit in Hokkaido, Japan and reaffirmed 
during their 2009 meeting in L’Aquila, Italy. In its 2008 Energy 
Technology Perspective, the International Energy Agency (IEA 
2008b) described a possible pathway for reducing global emis-
sions along these lines, broken down by sector and technology 
(tables  and 2). The IEA’s model looks for the lowest cost mix 
of emission abatement opportunities given currently available 
technology and projected future innovations (see box ). 
Reducing  emissions  associated  with  energy  demand  in 
buildings can occur in two ways:
n	by reducing the amount of energy a building consumes 
through improved efficiency; or
n	by reducing the emissions associated with that energy by 
switching from high-carbon sources like coal and petro-
leum to low-carbon sources like nuclear, hydropower, or 
renewable energy. 
The IEA (2008b) estimates that the buildings sector alone 
will need to reduce annual CO2 emissions by 8.2 billion tons 
below business-as-usual by 2050 through efficiency improve-
ments, an amount equal to nearly one third of global emissions 
today. Another 8.2 billion tons of reductions will need to 
come from lowering the emissions intensity of future electric-
ity supply, half which will be consumed in buildings. Together 
these building-related emission reductions account for more 
than one third of the total reductions the IEA sees as necessary 
to meet the climate challenge.
This is just one possible pathway to achieve target atmo-
spheric concentrations of greenhouse gasses. Different assump-
tions about technology cost or consumer behavior would lead 
to a different mix of abatement opportunities. But in most 
analyses, emission reductions in buildings are seen as a criti-
cal component of cost-effective climate policy. This is because 
improving  energy  efficiency  in  buildings  not  only  reduces 
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Table 1     IEA emission reductions by sector
Sector
CO2 emission reductions
Gt CO2 per year 
in 2050 Percent of total





Source:  BLUE  Map  scenario  from  International  Energy  Agency  (IEA 
008b).
Table 2     IEA emission reductions by technology
Technology
CO2 emission reductions
Gt CO2 per year 
in 2050 Percent of total
CCS industry and 
   transformation
4.3 9
CCS power generation 4.8 10
Nuclear .9 6
Renewables 10.1 1
Power generation efficiency 
   and fuel switching
3.4 7
End use fuel switching 5.3 11
End use electricity efficiency 5.8 1
End use fuel efficiency 11.5 4
Total 48 100
Source: BLUE Map scenario from International Energy Agency (IEA 008b). 
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GHG emissions but also lowers energy bills. Theoretically, 
the energy savings resulting from many efficiency improve-
ments more than offset the additional upfront-investment and 
ongoing operational costs. Such investments are described as 
having a negative abatement cost (see box  for definitions). 
Economically speaking, society as a whole is better off as a 
result of such investments, even before the benefits of halting 
climate change are taken into account. 
BARRIERS TO IMpROvING BUILDING 
EFFICIENCY
This notion of negative GHG abatement-cost opportunities 
has been popularized recently through work of the consul-
tancy McKinsey & Company, which graphically displays the 
abatement costs of a range of technologies on what is called 
an  emission-abatement  cost  curve  (2009).  An  illustrative 
example of this type of analysis from the International Energy 
Agency can be found in figure . The horizontal axis indicates 
the GHG reduction potential of a given technology. The verti-
cal axis indicates the net cost of that technology after energy 
savings are taken into account, measured in dollars per ton of 
CO2 reduced. The technologies on the left-hand side of the 
curve have negative abatement costs because the NPV of the 
energy savings achieved through these investments more than 
offset the additional investment cost. In work by McKinsey & 
Company and others, this is where most building efficiency 
investments lie. The technologies on the right-hand side of the 
cost curve have the highest abatement costs.
This  type  of  analysis  shows  there  are  ways  to  reduce 
emissions at no economic cost. Indeed, it suggests there are 
already abundant opportunities to turn a profit while saving 
the planet, even without climate policy that puts a price on 
carbon. The challenge is translating theory into practice. The 
very  fact  that  these  negative-cost  abatement  opportunities 
exist suggests that there must be barriers to implementation 
otherwise  we  would  have  captured  these  savings  regardless 
of climate change concerns. Understanding these barriers is 
particularly important in the buildings sector, where many 
abatement opportunities are potentially negative cost, and is 
critical in considering the types of policies needed to achieve 
the efficiency improvements in the buildings sector called for 
by the IEA. 
Market-based climate policies work by imposing a price for 
carbon equal to or greater than the cost of abating the required 
amount of CO2, thus making it profitable to reduce emissions. 
This can be done through a cap-and-trade system, where a fixed 
number of emission allowances are issued and the market sets 
the allowance price, or it can be achieved through a carbon tax, 
where policymakers try to reduce GHG emissions by taxing 
polluters for every ton they emit at a fixed rate.
But the existence of negative-cost abatement opportunities 
shows some of the limitations of market-based climate policy. 
If businesses and households have not already taken advantage 
of profitable efficiency-investment opportunities, there is good 
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Box 1     Definitions of selected key terms
To assess the attractiveness of a prospective investment in terms of reducing GHG emissions, economists start by calculat-
ing its net present value (NPV). This is done by subtracting the additional upfront operation and maintenance costs required 
for the more-efficient investment from the expected energy cost savings over the lifetime of the more-efficient investment. 
The energy cost savings used to calculate the NPV of a particular investment are discounted by 6 percent annually, to reflect 
the greater value consumers place on current vs future income. This can be thought of as the interest rate society expects 
on its efficiency investments. The NPV is then divided by the cumulative change in emissions resulting from the investment 
over the course of its life. This is known as the abatement cost and is expressed in dollars per ton of carbon dioxide (CO2). The 
abatement cost is the economic impact on society as a whole of policies to reduce emissions and is referred to as the eco-
nomic abatement cost in this policy brief. This is used in climate policy cost-benefit analysis, with the economic abatement 
cost weighed against the economic impact of climate change (referred to as the social cost of carbon) in order to assess the 
net benefit to society as a whole of reducing emissions. 
The economic abatement cost of a given investment, while expressed in dollars per ton of CO2, is different from the car-
bon price required to prompt households or firms to take advantage of that abatement opportunity. The economic abate-
ment cost is measured over the lifetime of the investment. Decision-makers often demand shorter payback periods and 
thus require a higher carbon price in order to make an emission-reducing investment. The carbon price required to induce 
households or firms to make this investment is referred to in this policy brief as the behavior-changing carbon price.N u m b e r   Pb0 9 - 1 7     A u g u s t   2 0 0 9
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reason to doubt that making those opportunities a little more 
profitable through a carbon price will make much difference.
What accounts for the disconnect between what the cost 
curves suggest makes economic sense and the actual behavior 
of  firms  and  individuals?  Academic  literature,  policy  expe-
rience, and business case studies cite a range of reasons. In 
multifamily residential and commercial buildings, the people 
making investment decisions are often different from those 
paying the energy bills (known as the “principal-agent prob-
lem”). In single-family homes, the owner sees the sticker price 
for more-efficient design or equipment but may lack informa-
tion about the potential energy cost savings. And even when 
that information is available, households have limited capi-
tal and may not be willing to make the upfront investment, 
even if it pays off fairly quickly. Businesses with greater access 
to capital may still be unwilling to accept payback periods 
stretched out over the life of the investment (the way most 
cost  curves  are  calculated),  given  uncertainty  about  future 
energy prices and actual energy cost savings. At the other end 
of the spectrum, the economic benefit of small investments, 
like compact florescent light bulbs or attic insulation, may not 
rise to the level where building owners take the time to make 
these improvements.
The net result is a market failure that makes it difficult to 
predict how market-based climate policy will change consum-
er behavior in the buildings sector. As part of the WBCSD’s 
Energy  Efficiency  in  Buildings  initiative,  a  consortium  of 
fourteen major global companies spent four years developing 
a model to simulate actual behavior in the buildings sector 
when it comes to improving efficiency (WBCSD 2009). The 
model, based on a rich database of building types, designs, and 
technologies, focuses on five submarkets: single-family resi-
dential buildings in France and the southeast United States, 
multifamily residential buildings in China, and office build-
ings in Japan and the northeast United States. In each submar-
ket, the model simulates investment decision-making based 
on a database of thousands of potential building types and 
equipment configurations, each with its own cost and energy-
demand  profile.  Passive  design,  energy-efficient  technology, 
and onsite power generation are all included in the model as 
options to reduce building-sector emissions.
This policy brief uses the WBCSD model to assess the 
amount of investment required to achieve the building-sector 
emission reductions called for by the IEA, the resulting energy 
cost savings, and the abatement cost of these investments. Per 
square meter results from the five WBCSD submarkets were 
converted into global estimates using energy demand and CO2 
emission data from the IEA (2008a, 2008c), economic growth 
projections from the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU 2009), 
and population forecasts from the United Nations Population 
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Figure 1     Marginal emission reduction costs for the global energy system, 2050
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Division (UNPD 2009).3 Upfront investment costs (known as 
“first costs”) and energy prices are held constant across regions, 
and energy savings are discounted at 6 percent annually over 
the average life of the investment (20 years in most cases in 
the WBCSD model) to assess the overall economic impact and 
to compare it with abatement opportunities in other sectors. 
I also used the WBCSD model to test the effectiveness of a 
range of policy scenarios in reducing building-sector emis-
sions, including carbon pricing, efficiency investment financ-
3. While the analysis in this policy brief uses cost and technology-adoption 
assumptions from the WBCSD model, my building stock and economic 
growth-rate assumptions are somewhat different from those used in the 
analysis reported in WBCSD (2009). The two approaches produce moderately 
divergent investment requirements for a given level of CO2 abatement, but are 
similar enough to produce the same policy conclusions. To estimate the size 
of the current global building stock, I divide total residential and commercial 
sector emissions in 2005 from the IEA (2008a) by the per-square foot energy 
demand assumptions from the WBCSD model multiplied by the carbon-
intensity of residential and commercial energy demand in 2005 from the IEA 
(2008a). I use the IEA’s commercial sector building stock growth estimates 
from the Energy Technology Perspective (IEA 2008b). For the residential sector, 
I average the GDP growth projections from the Economist Intelligence Unit 
(EIU 2009) with the population growth projections from the United Nations 
Population Division (UNPD 2009) to estimate residential building stock 
growth. This creates a business-as-usual emissions trajectory for the buildings 
sector as a whole similar to the IEA’s Energy Technology Perspectives (2008b). 
ing mechanisms, improved consumer awareness, and more-
efficient building standards and codesbuildings sector. These 
results are discussed later in the policy brief. 
INvESTMENT REQUIREMENTS OF IMpROvED 
EFFICIENCY
Achieving the emission reductions called for by the IEA would 
require significant upfront investment in more energy-efficient 
design and equipment and onsite renewable power generation. 
Based on the technology cost estimates in the WBCSD model, 
cutting annual buildings sector emissions by 8.2 billion tons 
below business-as-usual by 2050 would require an additional 
$ trillion per year in investment globally between now and 
2050 without taking into account the savings from energy effi-
ciency.4 This accounts for roughly .5 percent of global GDP 
over the same time period and would constitute an increase in 
energy-related investment of 8 percent. Of this, $209 billion 
4. When evaluating the economic impact of measures to reduce emissions, it’s 
important to keep in mind the economic cost of continuing on a business-
as-usual trajectory. Economists estimate that, left unchecked, climate change 
could cost the global economy 5 to 20 percent of GDP (Cline 992, 2009; 
Stern 2007).
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(billions of US dollars 
per year)
Net present value,* 
2005–50
(billions of US dollars 
per year)
Emission reduction 
relative to BAU 
(million tons in 2050)
Average abatement 
cost, 2005–50
(USD per metric ton)
OECD North America 244 –46 1,699 0
United States 209 –40 1,555 28
OECD Europe 170 –26 915 0
EU-27 158 –25 861 0
OECD Pacific 67 –17 5 48
Japan 7 –9 168 52
Transition economies 78 –12 548 24
Russia 51 –10 45 
Developing Asia 188 –26 2,4 14
China 114 –15 1,427 14
India 19 –2 221 12
Latin America 1 –5 148 9
Brazil 10 –2 28 61
Middle East 80 –17 66 2
Africa 29 – 298 10
World 1,042 –180 8,200 25
* Net present value is calculated over 20 years using constant energy prices and a 6 percent discount rate. 
Source: WBCSD Energy Efficiency in Buildings Model (WBCSD 2009), International Energy Agency, United Nations Development Program, Economist 
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per year would take place in the United States, $58 billion in 
the European Union, $4 billion in China, and $37 billion 
in  Japan  (table  3),  assuming  per-building  transformation 
occurs equally across regions.5 
This is significantly more than the investment cost esti-
mates in IEA (2008b), which estimated that $ trillion in 
additional investment annually would be sufficient to achieve 
target emission reductions in all sectors, not just in buildings. 
For residential and commercial buildings, IEA (2008b) esti-
mated that only $64 billion per year in additional investment 
would be required to reduce emissions by 8.2 billion tons by 
2050, only 6 percent of the estimates made in this policy 
brief using WBCSD data.
Much of the difference between these estimates can be 
explained  by  solar  photovoltaic  (PV)  technology.6  In  the 
IEA’s (2008b) model all 8.2 billion tons of emission reduc-
tions come from improvements in building efficiency. In the 
WBCSD  model,  however,  the  buildings  sector  must  move 
beyond  just  energy-efficient  equipment  and  design  and 
install onsite renewable power generation in order to achieve   
8.2 billion tons of reductions. The purchase and installation of 
solar PV panels to replace electricity purchased from the grid 
account for 53 percent of the forecasted investment cost in 
residential buildings and 9 percent in commercial buildings.7 
The WBCSD model assumes an installed solar PV cost of $8 
per watt in 2005, declining sharply to $5.5 per watt by 200 
5. Investment costs are calculated using the per-square foot cost of efficiency 
improvement from the WBCSD model for single-family residential, multi-
family residential and commercial buildings. The investment cost per square 
foot is held constant across regions and multiplied by the building stock 
estimates and growth in building stock described in footnote 3. 
6. Other factors contributing to higher investment costs in the WBCSD 
model are a) less aggressive technology learning curves for building shell design 
and materials (e.g. windows and insulation),  b) shorter building shell lifespan 
assumptions, c) more aggressive improvements in efficiency between 200 
and 2030 (rather than 2030-2050) when technology costs are higher and d) a 
less efficient optimal building design option (IEA uses a Passivhaus standard, 
which is significantly more efficient than the most efficient building code level 
in the WBCSD model).
7. A recent report from NAIOP (2008) also found that PV panels would be 
required to meet aggressive per-building energy-saving goals and would raise 
overall investment costs significantly. 
(a decline of 7 percent per year). This is a faster rate of decline 
than that observed in the US PV market over the past decade. 
The Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBL) estimated 
that between 998 and 2007, the installed cost of PV declined 
from $0.50 per watt to $7.60 per watt, an annual rate of 
decline of 3.5 percent (Wiser, Barbose, and Peterman 2009). 
Beyond  200,  however,  the  WBCSD  model  predicts  very 
modest annual declines in solar PV costs of 0.3 to 0.4 percent 
per year through 2050. This is based largely on an assump-
tion that nonmodule costs, like installation, will not decline 
over time. Module costs are assumed to continue declining at   
.7 percent per year through 2050. 
If  these  PV  cost  assumptions  prove  conservative,  the 
investment required to achieve 8.2 billion tons of emission 
reductions from buildings would fall considerably. There are 
reasons to be optimistic on this front. The LBL study (Wiser, 
Barbose, and Peterman 2009) observed a 5 percent annual 
decline in nonmodule costs over the past decade, putting them 
below the $4 per watt assumed in the WBCSD study. If these 
trends continue, overall installed cost will decline substantial-
ly.  During the first half of 2009, PV module costs declined by   
5 percent in the US and 4 percent in Europe and thin-film 
solar modules are now selling below $2.00 per watt. 8
While the investment required for building transforma-
tion is large, it is not unprecedented. In the United States, 
meeting  emission-reduction  goals  in  the  residential  sector 
would require an additional $39 billion in annual investment 
on average between now and 2050. Based on the technology 
cost estimates in the WBCSD model, reducing emissions from 
the US housing stock by 65 percent by 2050 would require a 
6 percent increase in the amount of money spent on residen-
tial building construction and renovation each year.9 This is 
roughly on par, in terms of scale, with the increase in spending 
that occurred between 2002 and 2007 as a result of low-cost 
capital and lax mortgage lending criteria, most prominently 
in  the  United  States  but  also  in  parts  of  Europe  and  the 
developing world. But while residential investments over the 
past decade grew less sustainable over time as income lagged 
and mortgage payments soared, investments in efficiency get 
cheaper over time as lower energy bills offset upfront costs and 
home resale values increase. Investment in building efficiency 
also replaces the need for investment in new power genera-
tion capacity. In the United States, annual investment in the 
electricity sector tops $60 billion. Globally, the IEA (2008b) 
predicts that $55 billion per year in investment in power 
generation  and  transmission  will  be  required  to  keep  pace 
8. Retail solar module price index from www.solarbuzz.com (accessed on 
August 3, 2009)
9. US residential construction data are from US Census Bureau (2009).
Failure to catalyze building-sector 
transformation will raise the cost of 
meeting long-term climate goals by at 
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with growing demand. Curbing some of that demand growth 
through efficiency improvements will free up capital that can 
be used in the buildings sector.
ENERGY SAvINGS AND EMISSION 
REDUCTIONS
The overall economic impact of investing $ trillion per year 
in the buildings sector to meet global emission-reduction goals 
is determined in large part by the energy cost savings that 
investment produces. If the savings provide a rate of return on 
the investment that is better than other investment options, 
then it is a net gain for the economy as a whole. If the lifetime 
energy savings fail to cover first costs, or provide a lower rate 
of return than alternative investment opportunities, then the 
investment has a net economic cost. This cost, however, comes 
with a social benefit: reducing greenhouse gas emissions. If 
the net economic cost of reducing emissions through build-
ing efficiency (referred to in this policy brief as the economic 
abatement cost; see box ) is less than the economic abate-
ment cost in other sectors, it can still be the most economic 
means of addressing climate change. 
Based on data from the WBCSD model, the majority 
of first costs required to reduce building-sector emissions by   
8.2 billion tons by 2050 would be offset by energy savings, 
but the offset is less than previous studies, such as McKinsey 
& Company (2009), have suggested. Many individual build-
ing improvements, like insulation and heat pumps, easily pay 
for themselves over the life of the product. Investments neces-
sary  to  achieve  whole-building  emission  reductions  of  50– 
75 percent, however, will not be paid back in energy savings at 
current energy prices, even over relatively long time horizons.0 
At the global level, 83 percent of the investment required for 
transformation is recovered over a 20 year period, resulting in 
a net cost of $80 billion per year. 
Efficiency measures in residential buildings offer better 
cost recovery than in commercial buildings, and within the 
residential  sector,  investments  in  multifamily  homes  score 
better  than  in  single-family  homes.  Variation  in  building 
stock between regions creates differences in the net present 
value (NPV) of efficiency investments. In the United States,   
$209 billion in annual investment to improve the efficiency 
0. The WBCSD model uses 2005 energy prices (primarily electricity and nat-
ural gas at the equivalent of $0.08-$0.0 per kilowatt hour) held constant in 
real term across regions and through 2050. The International Energy Agency 
(2008e) expects global oil and gas prices to roughly double by 2030, and the 
Energy Information Administration (2009) expects US electricity prices to in-
crease by 0% over the same period. This price increase would make efficiency 
investments more profitable than the WBCSD model estimates. 
of the buildings sector as a whole has a negative NPV of $40 
billion per year. In Europe, the NPV is negative $25 billion 
per year, and in Japan it is negative $9 billion (table 3). This 
is the economic cost of transforming the buildings sector at 
current energy prices.
While  significant  in  absolute  terms,  the  economic  cost 
of a 50 to 75 percent improvement in building efficiency is 
still cheap relative to other abatement opportunities. Cutting 
building emissions by 8.2 billion tons globally by 2050 has an 
average abatement cost of $25 per ton of CO2. Lower carbon-
intensity of energy supply makes abatement costs slightly higher 
in Europe ($30 per ton), while China’s coal-dominated energy 
mix yields an average abatement cost of $4 per ton. With a 
higher share of investment costs recovered through energy price 
savings, reducing emissions in residential structures is cheap-
er than in other parts of the buildings sector. In the United 
States, the average abatement cost for households is $9 per ton, 
compared with a building-sector wide average of $28 per ton.
These abatement costs do not include any CO2 emission 
reductions resulting from surplus onsite-generated renewable 
electricity sold to the grid. Solar panels installed on buildings 
produce more power than the building requires during the 
middle of the day and less than the building requires in the 
morning, evening, and at night. Electricity must be purchased 
from the grid during those times when onsite solar power is 
insufficient. But in places where utilities are equipped to buy 
electricity  from  rate-payers,  surplus  solar  power  generated 
during the day can be sold to the grid. This helps balance 
out the electricity purchased during solar off-hours. If utili-
ties purchased all surplus solar power produced in buildings 
and used it to replace existing generation, the investments 
described above would yield an additional  billion tons of 
annual emission reductions. This would lower average abate-
ment costs globally in the buildings sector from $25 to $22.50 
per ton of CO2. 
Given the WBCSD model’s conservative cost estimates 
for onsite solar generation, excluding PV altogether would 
reduce  abatement  costs  even  further.  As  mentioned  in  the 
previous section, nearly half of the investment required to 
achieve 8.2 billion tons of reductions in the WBCSD analysis 
Globally, a $30 per ton carbon price yields 
only 0.6 billion tons of annual emission 
reductions by 2050, far short of the 8.2 
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is attributable to solar panel purchases and installation. Yet if 
the ability to sell surplus generation to the grid is excluded 
from the model, PV accounts for only one third of the overall 
building-sector emission reductions. This leaves PV with an 
abatement cost well over $00 per ton, raising the building-
sector wide average abatement cost considerably. If the CO2 
emissions saved by selling surplus solar power to the grid are 
included in the model, the average abatement cost for PV falls 
to roughly $50 per ton over the 200–50 time frame. 
Even with the WBCSD’s cost estimates for PV (and exclud-
ing sales of surplus electricity back to the grid), reducing emis-
sion by 8.2 billion tons in the buildings sector is more afford-
able than IEA estimates of the cost of achieving comparable 
emission reductions from power generation, industry, or trans-
portation (IEA 2008b). The average building-sector abatement 
cost of $25 per ton based on the WBCSD model is slightly less 
than the $27 per ton abatement cost for the 8.2 billion tons 
of reductions from the power sector described in IEA (2008b) 
and is significantly less than the $57 per ton abatement cost 
for the 9. billion tons of reductions from industry. Failure to 
catalyze building-sector transformation, however, would require 
reducing emission by an additional 8.2 billion tons in other 
sectors,  requiring  deeper,  more  costly  investments  in  these 
sectors than forecast by the IEA (2008b). In power genera-
tion, the cost of these additional reductions would be $85 per 
ton based on IEA estimates (2008b). Reducing an additional   
8.2 billion tons of emissions from industry would cost more than 
$20 per ton, and it would cost well over $300 per ton in the 
transportation sector. This makes it critical from an economic 
standpoint to remove barriers to improved building efficiency. 
Failure to catalyze building-sector transformation will raise the 
cost of meeting long-term climate goals by at least $500 billion 
per year globally.
. Solar panel utilization rates vary by region due to differences in solar 
resources. For this policy brief, solar panel utilization rates are based on a 
sample of single-family residences in France and the US southeast, multi-fam-
ily residences in China, and commercial office buildings in the US northeast 
and Japan. 
THE pOLICY CHALLENGE
Given the central importance of building-sector transforma-
tion in responding to climate change affordably, it is critical 
to understand what policy approach will be most effective 
in  catalyzing  that  transformation.  As  discussed  previously, 
the fact that many abatement opportunities in the buildings 
sector already have a negative cost suggests that market-based 
climate policies, like a carbon tax or a cap and trade system 
will have limited success alone. This conclusion is supported 
by recent analyses of proposed market-based climate legisla-
tion in the United States. 
In  April  2008  the  Energy  Information  Administration 
(EIA) modeled the impact of the Lieberman-Warner Climate 
Security Act (S.29), a cap and trade proposal that would 
have reduced US emissions 33 percent below 2005 levels by 
2030 and 70 percent by 2050 (EIA 2008b). EIA forecasted that 
allowance prices would start at around $7 per ton and rise 
to $6 per ton by 2030. In the EIA’s National Energy Model-
ing System (NEMS), the vast majority of emission reductions 
resulting from this carbon price come from fuel switching in the 
power-generation sector. Building efficiency improves, but only 
modestly. In 2005 average residential energy consumption in 
the United States was 58,000 BTU per square foot. In the EIA’s 
business-as-usual scenario, residential energy use declined to 
45,000 BTU per square foot by 2030 (EIA 2008a). Under the 
Lieberman-Warner climate policy scenario, residential energy 
consumption declined to 4,000 BTU per square foot, only 0 
percent below business-as-usual (EIA 2008b). 
The WBCSD model allows for a similar assessment of 
the effectiveness of carbon pricing alone in improving build-
ing efficiency and reducing building-sector emissions. In the 
WBCSD model, households and firms select more energy-effi-
cient designs and equipment if the additional investment cost 
is recouped through energy savings in five years or less at a 
discount rate of 6 percent. Energy-efficient options with a first 
cost premium greater than 25 percent are disregarded. These 
assumptions are based on market research of observed invest-
ment decision-making in the buildings sector conducted by 
the WBCSD Energy Efficiency in Buildings project between 
2005 and 2009 (WBCSD 2009). 
Working with the WBCSD team, I analyzed the impact 
of a $30 per ton of CO2 carbon price on investment deci-
sion-making in all five submarkets. The effect is quite modest. 
Globally, a $30 per ton carbon price yields only 0.6 billion 
tons of annual emission reductions by 2050, far short of the 
8.2 billion tons required in the IEA analysis. Even though $30 
per ton is higher than the $25 per ton abatement cost for the 
buildings sector as a whole, it fails to produce the necessary 
Getting all the way to the 8.2 billion 
tons of emissions reductions called for 
in the IEA’s 2050 scenario will require 
new building codes and standards 
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transformation. This is primarily due to the difference between 
the economic abatement cost and the price for carbon neces-
sary to change investment decision-making when first costs 
must be recouped in five years or less rather than over the life-
time of the investment (the behavior-changing carbon price; 
see box ). Consider the following examples:2 
A household is in the market for a new central air condi-
tioning system. The standard system costs $8,000, and the 
more energy-efficient system costs $9,000. The more-efficient 
system would save the household $32 per year and last 20 
years. At a 6 percent discount rate, only $400 of the $,000 
premium would be recouped in energy cost savings over the 
life of the system in the absence of a carbon price. But because 
the more energy-efficient system would save one ton of CO2 
per year, a carbon price of $30 per ton would allow for full cost 
recovery over the life of the system (the economic abatement 
cost). Covering the first cost premium in five years, however, 
would require a carbon price of $63 per ton (the behavior-
changing carbon price). 
Decision-makers in other sectors, like power generation, 
have longer payback periods than owners of residential and 
commercial  buildings,  which  narrows  the  gap  between  the 
behavior-changing carbon price and the economic abatement 
cost. Take, for example, a utility company choosing between 
building a coal-fired power plant and a wind farm. The wind 
farm would cost $00 million more than the coal-fired power 
plant but would save 50,000 tons of CO2 per year. If the life 
of the equipment were 20 years, the economic abatement cost 
would be $58 per ton (using a 6 percent discount rate). If the 
investor in the wind farm required a 0 year payback period, the 
behavior-changing carbon price would be $9 per ton. Since 
this is less than the $63 per ton required to prompt the house-
hold to purchase a more-efficient air conditioning system, the 
wind farm investment would happen sooner if a market-based 
regime like a carbon tax or a cap and trade system were the only 
climate policy in place, even though the overall economic cost 
2. The numbers used in these examples are for illustrative purposes only. The 
actual abatement cost of a wind farm could well be less than that of a more 
energy-efficient air conditioning system. 
per ton of CO2 reduced is greater for the wind farm investment 
than for the more-efficient air conditioning system. By simu-
lating actual investment decision-making, the WBCSD model 
demonstrates  the  limitations  of  using  market-based  policies 
alone to spur improvements in the energy efficiency of build-
ings. Complementary policies are necessary. 
ATTRACTING LONG-TERM INvESTMENT
As illustrated in the examples above, the economics of energy 
efficiency are shaped in large part by the amount of time a 
household or business is willing to wait to recoup its invest-
ment.  Increasing  public  awareness  of  potential  energy  cost 
savings through education, labeling, and advanced metering 
can  play  an  important  role  in  extending  required  payback 
periods, but only up to a point. Ultimately, households have 
limited capital and must balance efficiency improvements with 
college  tuition,  medical  expenses,  and  retirement  savings.3 
Implementing  the efficiency investments required  to trans-
form single-family homes in line with global emission-reduc-
tion goals will require external capital. 
The deepest and most affordable pool of capital avail-
able to homeowners is the mortgage market. New mortgage 
origination totals in the trillions of dollars each year in the 
United States alone (Greenspan and Kennedy 2005). Some 
banks have begun experimenting with the concept of “green 
mortgages,” where the interest rate is lowered if the buyer opts 
for  a  more  energy-efficient  home  and  the  potential  energy 
savings can be verified by the bank. The bank’s willingness to 
lower the interest rate for the loan is based on an improvement 
in the perceived creditworthiness of the borrower as a result of 
lower monthly utility costs.
Another potential source of low-cost, long-term capital 
is the utility sector. Market fragmentation, obstacles to data 
collection, and uncertainty about future energy prices, which 
all make it difficult to tap the mortgage market for efficiency 
investments, are less of a challenge for utilities. Electrical utili-
ties have access to low-cost capital, have an existing relationship 
with every home, can accurately track energy consumption, 
and are well positioned to forecast future energy prices. As a 
result policymakers are increasingly focusing on electrical utili-
ties as a potential source of efficiency investments (Cappers et 
al. 2009, Brennan 2009). The theory behind this effort is that 
utilities would make direct investments in energy-efficiency 
equipment and design and share the savings from these invest-
3. Retirement savings could potentially be a powerful pool of capital for 
efficiency investments if financial intermediaries are able to structure efficiency 
investments to meet the risk profile households expect when planning for 
retirement.
Transformation of the buildings sector 
along the lines outlined here would more 
than offset these cost increases, cutting 
overall household energy expenses from 
$285 billion per year in 2030 to $130 billion.N u m b e r   Pb0 9 - 1 7     A u g u s t   2 0 0 9
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ments with households. But such policies require that regula-
tions be changed to allow utilities to earn revenue by delivering 
efficiency rather than energy. In the United States a number 
of states have begun experimenting with “decoupling” utility 
revenue from electricity sales. Decoupling can be structured 
so that utilities are ambivalent to efficiency improvements by 
rate-payers—i.e., their revenue stream can be determined by 
the number of customers rather than by the quantity of elec-
tricity delivered—or so that utilities have incentives to admin-
ister efficiency programs and to make equipment investments 
themselves (Cappers et al. 2009). 
For  multifamily  residential  and  commercial  buildings, 
the challenge is a bit different. Owners of these large build-
ings are not under the same capital constraints as single-family 
homeowners, but they also do not have the same incentives 
to improve efficiency. In most office or apartment buildings, 
the owners make investment choices but the tenants pay for 
energy. These split incentives prevent efficiency improvements 
even when building owners have the means to make them. 
Split incentives can be overcome through financial interme-
diaries, such as energy service companies (ESCOs) and banks 
providing direct access to capital markets (WBCSD 2009), 
but policy will be required to address some of the credit risks 
specific to efficiency finance like energy price volatility and the 
inability to adequately collateralize efficiency equipment. 
Successfully  connecting  households  and  firms  with 
deep pools of long-term capital improves the effectiveness of 
market-based climate policy considerably. Using the WBCSD 
model to simulate investment decision-making, a $30 per ton 
carbon price in an environment where investors are willing to 
accept a 0-year payback at a 0 percent discount rate yielded 
3.9  billion  tons  of  emission  reductions  globally  by  2050,   
48 percent of the total called for by the IEA.4
CLOSING THE GAp WITH CODES AND 
STANDARDS
Getting all the way to the 8.2 billion tons of emissions reduc-
tions called for in the IEA’s 2050 scenario will require new 
building  codes  and  standards  exclusively  focused  on  energy 
efficiency. While market-based mechanisms generally achieve 
policy objectives at lower cost than codes and standards, where 
market failures exist other measures are required. In the case 
of climate policy, building efficiency codes and standards could 
significantly  reduce  the  overall  economic  cost  of  reducing 
4. Based on a literature review and interviews, I selected a 0-year payback 
window and a 0 percent discount rate as proxies for greater involvement by 
financial intermediaries in financing efficiency investments.
emissions. Recall the examples discussed above. The coal-fired 
power plant can either be replaced with one wind farm or with 
50,000 more energy-efficient air conditioners. Market-based 
climate policy alone would give preference to the wind farm, 
even though the economic abatement cost of the wind farm is 
higher than the abatement cost of the air conditioners. Codes 
that  required  more-efficient  air  conditioning  systems  would 
overcome  this  market  failure  and,  in  these  examples,  save 
$420,000 per year. So while standards still impose an economic 
cost, in the case of buildings that cost is likely to be lower than 
the alternatives. 
The costs building owners would likely face from new 
energy-efficiency standards are certainly not unprecedented. 
Even after introducing a $30 per ton of CO2 carbon price and 
extending payback periods to ten years through financial inter-
mediation in the United States, codes and standards would 
still be required to prompt the additional $40 billion per 
year in efficiency investments needed to meet 2050 emission-
reduction goals. These energy-efficiency codes and standards 
would result in a 0 percent premium over business-as-usual 
building-sector  investment  between  2005  and  2050,  all  of 
which would be recouped through energy cost savings over 
the lifetime of the efficiency improvements. By comparison, 
meeting building fire codes in the United States requires a   
5 percent investment premium, none of which is recuperated 
through future cost savings.5 
Codes and standards come with administrative costs, which 
are not included in this analysis. Code development, manage-
ment, training, and enforcement all require resources, much 
of which will be borne by government. Market-based climate 
policy requires government management as well, of course, and 
it is unclear which policy approach imposes greater adminis-
trative  costs.  But  codes  and  standards,  unlike  market-based 
policies, require households to improve efficiency rather than 
merely providing an incentive for them to do so. While there 
is both a macroeconomic case for the use of codes and stan-
dards as a climate policy tool and a number of microeconomic 
benefits from these policies for individual households and firms 
over time, new building efficiency codes would require energy 
consumers to make significant upfront investments they would 
not otherwise have been willing to undertake. Fortunately the 
same market-based climate policy that is effective in reducing 
emissions in other sectors also generates resources that can be 
used to offset the costs of new energy efficiency codes for build-
ings. Coupling market-based climate policy with building codes 
and standards can also help guard against a building efficiency 
5. This calculation is based on 2005 estimates. Fire code compliance cost 
estimates are from Hall (2008). US property investment data are from US 
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rebound effect, where households respond to lower energy bills 
by consuming more energy (e.g., leaving lights on, running air 
conditioning longer, and plugging in more appliances).
OFFSETTING COSTS TO CONSUMERS
Market-based  climate  policy  works  by  raising  the  price  of 
high-carbon energy, such as coal, oil, and natural gas, relative 
to low-carbon energy, such as nuclear, hydroelectric power, 
and  renewables,  prompting  firms  and  consumers  to  make 
the  switch  to  lower-carbon  energy  sources.  Higher  energy 
prices can be quite regressive in their impact, depending on 
how revenue generated from these policies is used (Burtraw, 
Sweeney, and Walls 2009). Low-income consumers and rural 
populations spend a larger share of their disposable income 
on  energy  than  do  urban  populations  and  more-affluent 
consumers. This creates a political mandate in most countries 
to develop mechanisms that make the distributional impact of 
climate policy more progressive. 
Both  cap-and-trade  and  carbon  tax  systems  generate 
resources that can be used in this effort, the former through the 
auction of allowance permits and the latter through direct tax 
revenue. In Europe the market value of allowances issued each 
year under the European Union’s Emissions Trading System 
(ETS) has ranged between 0 billion to 30 billion euros since 
its launch in 2005.6 In the United States the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) estimates that the American Clean 
Energy and Security Act of 2009 now working its way through 
Congress would produce allowances valued at between $62 and 
$99 billion per year between 202 and 2050 (EPA 2009). 
One  strategy  for  containing  cost  increases  faced  by 
consumers is to provide emission allowances free to energy 
suppliers like electrical utilities and natural gas distributers. 
This  was  the  strategy  adopted  during  phases  one  and  two 
of the EU Emissions Trading System and it has resulted in 
considerable criticism both inside and outside the European 
Union that the provision of free allowances results in windfall 
profits for utilities without preventing electricity prices from 
increasing. As Ellerman and Joskow demonstrated in a 2008 
report for the Pew Center on Global Climate Change, the key 
variable in the impact of free allowances on electricity prices 
is the degree of regulation the utility faces. Regulated entities 
can be prevented from raising electricity prices while simulta-
neously capturing allowance value, but utilities in competitive 
electricity markets are less constrained. Burtraw, Sweeney, and 
Walls from Resources for the Future have done extensive work 
on the distributional impacts of climate policy in the United 
6. Point Carbon, Carbon Market Monitor. January 2008: A review of 2007.
States, particularly in terms of how allowances are distributed. 
They found (Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 2009) that provid-
ing allowances free to emitters is regressive in its impact, while 
auctioning allowances and providing the revenue to house-
holds either directly through a “cap-and-dividend” policy or 
through expanding the Earned Income Tax Credit would be 
more progressive. 
While distributing allowance revenue to vulnerable groups 
can  make  climate  policy  less  regressive,  improved  building 
efficiency can do the same by ensuring that an increase in 
energy prices does not result in an increase in total energy 
costs for households. In the United States, for example, the 
EIA estimated that the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security 
Act of 2007 would have raised residential energy prices by   
 percent by 2030 (EIA 2008b). While the modest improve-
ments in building efficiency projected by the EIA would have 
mitigated some of these increases, overall household expendi-
tures in 2030 would have been $0 billion higher than in the 
absence of climate policy. 
Transformation  of  the  buildings  sector  along  the  lines 
outlined in this policy brief would more than offset these cost 
increases, cutting overall household energy expenses from $285 
billion per year in 2030 to $30 billion (figure 2), given EIA’s 
(2008b) estimates for future energy and emission allowance 
prices, which are different from those used in the WBCSD 
model.7 A relatively small share of the government revenue 
raised through a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade program could 
offset the costs to businesses and households of complying with 
the more-stringent building efficiency codes that would make 
such a transformation possible. Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
(2008), modeling the impact of using 25 percent of allowance 
revenue to invest in efficiency programs, found that these invest-
ments would reduce the cost of climate policy for the economy 
as a whole relative to providing free allowances to emitters and 
would result in a net welfare gain for low-income households.
This  is  particularly  important  in  Europe,  where  the 
comparatively low carbon-intensity of energy supply means 
that meeting aggressive emission-reduction targets will require 
more-ambitious  improvements  in  energy  efficiency.  The 
German Federal Environment Agency estimated that reduc-
ing GHG emissions by 40 percent below 990 levels by 2020 
would cost $3 billion annually, one third of which would 
come from spending on building and infrastructure modern-
ization; but improving end-use energy efficiency would yield 
savings of $38 billion per year (Bundesumweltamt 2008).
7. This does not include the decline in energy prices that would likely result 
from such a steep drop in demand. This price effect would extend household 
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CONCLUSION
Reducing emissions in the buildings sector in line with global 
emission reductions of 50 percent below current levels by 2050 
is possible with existing technology and without compromising 
living standards. In analyzing the cost of such reductions, and 
the mix of policies necessary to achieve it, this policy brief finds 
the following:
n	Reducing building-sector emissions by the 8.2 billion tons 
outlined by the IEA would require an additional $ trillion 
in annual investment based on the WBCSD’s technology 
cost assessment. As these cost assessments are conserva-
tive, particularly for onsite solar power generation, overall 
investment costs could be reduced significantly by innova-
tion and through economies of scale.  
n	Energy cost savings at current prices would recover most, 
but not all, of this investment. Reducing building-sector 
emissions in line with global goals would come at an aver-
age economic cost of $25 per ton. 
n	Given barriers to action by building owners and occupants, 
a carbon price of $25 per ton alone would not catalyze 
the necessary transformation. New approaches to efficiency 
financing are critical, but these must be coupled with new 
codes and standards. 
n	Failure to overcome barriers to efficiency improvements in 
buildings would raise the cost of meeting emission-reduc-
tion goals considerably. Making up the 8.2 billion tons in 
buildings sector emission reductions outlined by the IEA 
via emission reductions in other sectors would impose an 
additional economic cost of at least $500 billion per year 
globally. 
n	Successful transformation of the buildings sector, on the 
other  hand,  can  offset  the  impact  of  increased  electric-
ity and fossil fuel prices resulting from climate policy on 
household income, ensuring that higher energy prices do 
not translate into higher energy costs.
n	How revenue generated from market-based climate policy 
like a carbon tax or cap-and-trade system is used deter-
mines  the  distributional  impact  of  reducing  emissions. 
Using revenue to improve building efficiency helps make 
climate policy more progressive. 
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